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COMMENTS

ENTERPRISE LIABILITY RECOVERY
THEORIES: WILL THEY WORK
IN TEXAS?
by Ann E. Ward

A

fundamental principle of tort law requires that a plaintiff show a

causal connection between his injury and the defendant's act
before recovery will be granted.' In strict products liability cases
causation consists of three elements. First, the plaintiff must show that he
was injured by a product; second, that the injury occurred because the
product was defective; and third, that the defect existed at the time the
product left the defendant's hands.2 The plaintiff thus must show that he
was injured by an act of the defendant or an instrumentality within the
3
defendant's control.
The required showing necessitates a preliminary identification of the defendant as the manufacturer or seller of the product in question. 4 Failure
1. McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980); Missouri
Pac. R.R. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977); General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Tex. 1977); Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pac. Coal &
Oil Co., 298 S.W. 554, 564 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted); Texas & N.O. Ry. v.
Rooks, 292 S.W. 536, 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted); C. MORRIS & C.
MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 155 (2d ed. 1980); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1969);
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 631-32 (Tex. 1969); Jack Roach-Bissonnet, Inc.
v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262, 278 (Tex. 1967); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 103; Note, IndustryWide Liability: Solving the Mystery ofthe Missing Manufacturer in ProductsLiability Law,
38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139, 142 (1981).
3. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Fillmore, 453 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1970, no writ); see also Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. 1972)
(even in strict liability, where product supplier's care irrelevant and liability based solely on
act of selling defective product, causation is essential element). Regarding imposition of
strict liability without regard to the seller's care, see McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
4. Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co. v. Childress, 277 Ala. 285, 169 So. 2d 305, 312
(1964); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 84, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 734 (1978);
Matthews v. GSP Corp., 368 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Keen v. Dominick's
Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1977); Dawley v. Thisius, 304
Minn. 453, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILiTy § 11.01[4] (1982).
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to so identify a responsible defendant normally prevents recovery.5 Identification of the manufacturer ordinarily is not difficult because the identity
of the manufacturer is either well-known or uncontested. 6 In some cases,
however, the plaintiff, through no fault of his own, is unable to show who
manufactured the injury-causing product. For example, the means of
7
identification may have been destroyed in the injury-causing accident.
Identification may also be impossible when the product-related injury does
not occur until many years after all evidence of the manufacturer's identity
has been lost.8 The injury may also have resulted from exposure to similar
products of different manufacturers, so that no one manufacturer's product
can be clearly identified as the cause of the injury.9 The potential for injury by the product of an unidentifiable manufacturer is enhanced by the
large number of fungible products available in today's market.' 0
The current litigation concerning asbestos illustrates the plaintiffs dilemma."I Asbestos is a heat- and chemical-resistant mineral widely used
as an insulating, packing, and fireproofing material. 12 Exposure to asbestos dust or fibers creates significant health hazards to persons involved in
the mining, manufacture, or commercial application of the material, as
well as to persons residing in the vicinity of asbestos plants or even in the
households of asbestos workers.' 3 A person who inhales asbestos dust or
fibers may contract asbestosis, a noncancerous but irreversible lung dis5. Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Kinsey v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 137 Ga. App. 681, 225 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1976); McDonough v. General Motors
Corp., 6 Mich. App. 239, 148 N.W.2d 911, 913 (1967); Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa.
Super. 39, 23 A.2d 342, 345 (1941). For a general discussion of the identification requirement, see Annot., 51 A.L.R.3D 1344 (1973).
6.

I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.41 (2d ed.

1974).
7. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(plaintiffs injured by exploding blasting caps; all evidence of manufacturer's identity destroyed in blast).
8. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20, 28 (1979).
9. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
10. LaMarca, Market Share Liability, Industry- Wide Liability, Alternative Liability and
Concert of Action. Modern Legal Concepts PreservingLiabilityfor Defective But Unidentlfiable Products, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 61, 62-65 (1982). The author notes that the identification
problem is complicated by the existence of trade associations, industry-wide standards, and
governmental regulations, tending to cause uniformity among products. Id at 63. Additionally, intra-industry cooperation and sharing of data effectively eliminate any distinguishing features among the products of different manufacturers. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal.
3d 588, 606, 607 P.2d 924, 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140-41, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
11. That the identification problem in generic product cases is of immense proportions
is illustrated by the fact that as of 1978 over 1,000 lawsuits had been filed in the United
States alleging injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. Comment, Asbestos Litigation:
The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55, 73-74 (1978).
12. See generally Comment, supra note 11 (discussing asbestos industry); 40 Fed. Reg.
47,652-63 (1975) (discussing physical characteristics of asbestos); Sweeney, The Asbestosis
Time Bomb, TRIAL, Oct. 1978, at 17 (discussing relationship between asbestos exposure and
asbestosis).
13. Comment, supra note 11, at 58 (citing Anderson, HouseholdContact Asbestos Neoplastic Risk, 271 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 311 (1976); Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, Asbestos
Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 J. A.M.A. 22 (1964); Wagner, Sleggs & Marchand, Difuse
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ease, or mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer.14 Both diseases have a latency period of ten to twenty-five years between initial exposure and
apparent effect.' 5 Once inhaled, asbestos dust and fibers remain permanently in the lungs, thus having a cumulative effect. 16 This cumulative
effect makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of a series of
exposures to asbestos caused the disease. 17 A plaintiff exposed to the asbestos products of a number of manufacturers over a long time period may
be unable to identify the manufacturer of the product responsible for his
injury.
Litigation involving the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) also exemplifies
the manufacturer identification problem.' 8 DES is a synthetic estrogen
manufactured by many companies between 1947 and 1971 and prescribed
to pregnant women for the prevention of miscarriages.' 9 Some of the
daughters of women who took DES now suffer from cancer or pre-cancerous conditions caused by their mothers' ingestion of DES. 20 The time
lapse between the mothers' intake of the drug and the manifestation of
harmful effects in their daughters makes identification of the manufacturer
21
of the specific injury-causing drug virtually impossible.
Courts in both asbestos and DES cases have generally held that inability
to identify the correct defendant precludes recovery. 22 A few courts, howPleuralMesothelioma andAsbestos Exposure in North Western Cape Province, 17
INDUS. MED.

BRIT.

J.

260 (1960)).

14. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing
Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42 AM. J. MED. 487
(1967); Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrenceof Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 139 (1965)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Comment,

supra note 11, at 58-64 (citing P.

BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS

15 (1973); Sweeney,

supra note 12; Wagner, Sleggs & Marchand, supra note 13).
15. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing
Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg & Hammond, supra note 14; Selikoff, Churg & Hammond,
supra note 14), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
16. 493 F.2d at 1083.
17. Id
18. Like the asbestos litigation, the DES cases are numerous. By 1978 some 80 to 100
cases regarding DES-related illnesses were pending in the United States. Comment, DES
and a ProposedTheory of EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 966-67 (1978).
19. Id at 963-64 (citing Davis & Fugo, Steroids in the Treatment of Early Pregnancy
Complications, 142 J. A.M.A. 778 (1950); Dieckmann, Davis, Rynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does
the Administrationof DiethylstilbestrolDuringPregnancyHave Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J.
OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1062 (1953); Karnaky, The Use of Stilbestrolfor the Treatment of
Threatenedand HabitualAbortion and PrematureLabor.- A PreliminaryReport, 35 S. MED.
J. 838 (1942); Smith, Diethylstilbestrolin the Prevention and Treatment of Complications of
Pregnancy, 56 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 821 ('1948)).

20. Comment, supra note 18, at 964-66 (citing B. SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN
SEX HORMONES 29 (1977); Herbst, Robboy, Scully & Poskanzer, Clear-CellAdenocarcinoma
of the Vagina and Cervix in Girls." Analysis of 170 Registry Cases, 119 AM. J. OBSTET. &
GYNEC. 713, 720 (1974); Herbst, Scully & Robboy, Problems in the Examination ofthe DESExposed Female, 46 OBSTET. & GYNEC. 353, 354 (1975); Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-AdenossCarcinomaSyndrome, 38 CANCER 426, 428 (1976)).
21. Comment, supra note 18, at 972; see also Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort LawReflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982) (discussing difficulty in proving
causation against individual .Arug manufacturer).
22. Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599-600 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (DES); Starling
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (asbestos); Mizell v. Eli
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ever, have attempted to fashion a solution to the plaintiffs identification
problem. These courts have developed the "enterprise liability" theories
of products liability. 23 The notion of enterprise liability encompasses theories of alternative liability, concert of action, industry-wide liability, and
market share liability. These theories relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
identifying the manufacturer of the injury-causing product. This Comment examines each of the enterprise liability theories of recovery, reports
the current status of each one in American courts, and analyzes the compatibility of these theories with Texas law.
I.

ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY

Alternative liability is the term commonly applied 24 to the rule announced in Summers v. Tice. 25 In Summers the plaintiff and the two defendants were hunting together. During the hunt the defendants happened
to fire their shotguns simultaneously in the plaintiffs direction. A shotgun
pellet struck the plaintiffs eye. Both of the defendants were found to have
acted negligently, but the plaintiff could not prove which defendant had
fired the shot that injured his eye. 26 Under prior law neither defendant
would have been held liable because they had not acted in concert. 27 The
California Supreme Court held, however, that the unfairness of such a result demanded that the negligent defendants be held jointly and severally
liable to the plaintiff, even though they had not acted in concert and could
not both have caused the injury.28 The court stated that the burden rested
Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981) (DES); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co.,
178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (DES).
23. Courts and legal scholars have traditionally used the term "enterprise liability" to
refer to liability imposed on a business for torts arising out of or connected with the business.
The earliest form of enterprise-associated liability was respondeat superior. Enterprise liability also includes the employer's duty to provide workers' compensation for job-related
injuries and the strict products liability of manufacturers of defective products. These forms
of liability generally have a no-fault basis, relying instead on the notion that the losses resulting from a particular enterprise should be borne by persons who have some logical relation to the enterprise. Regarding traditional forms of enterprise liability, see Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Gregory,
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976); Steffen, EnterpriseLiability.Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1965). The theories of enterprise liability this Comment analyzes rely on the same policy of risk allocation as does enterprise
liability in the ordinary sense, but they operate on a fault rather than a no-fault basis. The
term "enterprise liability" as used herein thus refers to a distinct subsection of businessrelated liability.
24. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 41, at 243; Kroll, Intra-IndustryJoint Liability.The Era of Absolute Products Liability, 1980 INs. L.J. 185, 188 [hereinafter cited as Kroll,
Absolute Products Liability]; Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability.- A New Era in Products
Liability, 1979 INs. L.J. 193, 195; LaMarca, supra note 10, at 68-69; Note, Industry-Wide
Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 1007 (1979).
25. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
26. 199 P.2d at 2.
27. Wilder v. Shannon, 21 Ala. App. 163, 106 So. 69 (1925); Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185
Cal. 87, 196 P. 25, 34 (1921); Dickson v. Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N.W. 948, 950-52 (1922).
28. 199 P.2d at 3-4. The court noted that the policy supporting this decision was similar
to the reasoning behind the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the court adapted to the facts of
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944); Summers, 199 P.2d at 4. In
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on each defendant to absolve himself if he could. 29
The conduct giving rise to alternative liability thus is not a true joint
tort, but rather involves independent wrongful acts of two or more
tortfeasors, only one of whom actually causes the injury. 30 Concerted action need not be shown. 3' Alternative liability is only available when all
possible tortfeasors are named as defendants, 32 so that one of the parties
before the court must necessarily have caused the injury. 33 The plaintiff
must prove that each defendant acted tortiously 34 and that evidence linking any single defendant to the harm is unavailable. 35 The burden then
shifts to each defendant to demonstrate that he was not responsible for the
harm. 36 Any defendant who proves he did not cause the injury avoids
liability, while those unable to absolve themselves remain jointly and severally liable.

37

Some courts apply a modified version of alternative liability to impose
Ybarra the plaintiff was injured while unconscious on an operating table. The Ybarra court
stated that "the particular force and justice" of applying res ipsa loquitur in those circumstances rested on the fact that evidence regarding which of the defendants was culpable was
completely inaccessible to the plaintiff. Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 689. The court therefore shifted
to the defendants the burden of showing who was at fault. Id, cited in Summers, 199 P.2d at
4.
29. 199 P.2d at 5.
30. LaMarca, supra note 10, at 68 (citing Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289
N.W.2d 20, 25 (1979)).
31. 199 P.2d at 3. The Summers court expressly rejected any notion of concerted activity as a basis for its decision, relying instead solely on the policy of fairness to an innocent
plaintiff. Id
32. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603-04, 607 P.2d 924, 931, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 139, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); cf Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004,
1016-17 (D.S.C. 1981) ("all or substantially all" possible tortfeasors must be before court).
33. Kroll,Absolute Products Liability, supra note 24, at 189; Comment, supra note 18, at
986.
34. LaMarca, supra note 10, at 69.
35. Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96, 98 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Lyons v.
Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185, 190 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979). The plaintiff need not show, however, that the defendants had greater access
than the plaintiff to information regarding causation. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d
588, 599-600, 607 P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
36. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 598, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
136, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Summers, 199 P.2d at 5.
37. Summers, 199 P.2d at 5; LaMarca, supra note 10, at 82. The Summers rule was
adopted in § 433B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 433B provides in part:
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to
prove that he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).

A few jurisdictions have adopted alternative liability as that theory is set out in Summers
and the Restatement (Second). See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Diplomat Parking Corp.,
282 A.2d 564, 565 (D.C. 1971) (action against insurance companies for coverage on stolen
vehicle where loss occurred near time when one insurer's coverage ended and other's began,
and both companies had negligently failed to inspect insured premises); Anderson v.
Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (hospital patient's suit in which plaintiff's injury was
caused either by defective surgical instrument or by physician's negligence, but not by both),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Thrower v. Smith, 62 A.D.2d 907,406 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1978)
(chain automobile collision case in which it was found that act of only one of defendant
drivers caused accident).
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joint and several liability on tortfeasors who have combined through concurring wrongful acts to cause a single indivisible injury. 38 This rule,
known as "double fault and alternative liability," 39 differs from true alternative liability, in which only one of the tortfeasors actually caused the
harm. The indivisible injury cases nevertheless rely on a policy similar to
that underlying true alternative liability. Requiring a plaintiff to apportion
damages among several defendants is unfair, according to courts that apply this modified theory, when each defendant acted wrongfully and contributed to the plaintiffs injury.40 Such courts hold that permitting the
injured party to recover is preferable to allowing all of the defendants to
one of the tortfeasors may pay more than his
escape liability, even though
41
share of the damages.
Similar reasoning has been employed to extend the modified alternative
liability
theory to products liability. In Borel v. FibreboardPaperProducts
Corp.42 the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos products of several manufacturers over a thirty-three-year period. The specific exposure that caused
the plaintiffs injury could not be identified. 43 The court relied on the cumulative effect of repeated asbestos exposure, however, to find that each
successive exposure could have caused a separate injury. 44 Concluding
that each manufacturer was the cause in fact of some injury to the plaintiff,
the court adopted the modified alternative liability theory to relieve the
burden of apportioning damages among the sevplaintiff of the impossible
45
eral defendants.
One court has adopted the alternative liability theory in a products liability case involving generic pharmaceutical products. In Ferrigno v. Eli
Lilly & Co. ,4 a DES case, the New Jersey Superior Court relied on state
supreme court precedent applying alternative liability in a negligence action. 47 The Ferrigno court noted a strong state policy favoring recovery by
innocent plaintiffs who cannot identify the source of their injuries and asserted that this policy becomes even more compelling when all of the defendants are wrongdoers. 48 The court pointed out the defendants' joint
38. Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Rudd v. Grimm,

252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1961) (citing Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc.,
330 S.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Ky. 1959)); Riley v. Indus. Fin. Serv. Co., 157 Tex. 306, 310, 302
S.W.2d 652, 655-56 (1957). An indivisible injury is an injury caused by the concurrent tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers that cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty
to the individual wrongdoers. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251,
256, 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (1952).
39. W. PROSSER, supra note i, § 41, at 243.
40. Woodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 462 S.W.2d 205, 209 (1971).
41. Holtz v. Holder, 101 Ariz. 247, 418 P.2d 584, 588 (1966).
42. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding expressly not limited to cases of concurring
tortious conduct), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
43. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
44. 493 F.2d at 1094.
45. Id at 1095-96 (citing Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251,
248 S.W.2d 731 (1952) (establishing indivisible injury rule in Texas)).
46. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
47. Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1,5-6, cert.denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
48. 420 A.2d at 1314.
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membership in a group of manufacturers who had each produced an identical product proven to be defective, 49 and the defendants' high duty of
care to the public arising out of the nature of the pharmaceutical industry.5 0 Finally, the court emphasized that the defendants had contributed to
the plaintiffs inability to identify the responsible party by marketing a
fungible item whose harmful effects did not appear until years after its
use.5 1 These factors led the court to remove the plaintiffs burden of identifying the culpable manufacturer. 52 The court expressed a lack of sympathy for the defendants, upon whom it placed the burden of proving that
they had not caused the plaintiff's loss, despite a likelihood that the responsible party was not before the court.5 3 Ferrigno is the only products
liability case purporting to impose alternative liability, 54 and even this application of the theory deviates from true alternative liability because some
of the possibly culpable parties were admittedly not before the court. 55
by only a small
Moreover, alternative liability continues to be employed
56
number of jurisdictions even in negligence cases.
As the Ferrigno case demonstrates, alternative liability extends liability
far beyond the traditional situations in which joint and several liability
57
rested on evidence that the particular defendant contributed to the loss.
49. Id. at 1313.

50. Id
51. Id at 1314.

52. Id. at 1313-16.
53. Id (relying on language in Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 308, 338 A.2d 1, 10,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975)). The court expressly rejected the alternative liability analysis appearing in Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603-04, 607 P.2d 924, 930-31, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 138-39, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The California court in Sindell
refused to apply the theory because of the strong probability that the guilty party was not
before the court. 26 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
54. Cf Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 843, 271 N.W.2d 777, 782 n.15
(1978) (implying in footnote that alternative liability may be applicable in products liability
cases).

55. 420 A.2d at 1314.
56. Robinson, supra note 21, at 723. Several courts have rejected alternative liability in
products cases. In Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d
185 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), the plaintiff identified one of the defendants as the manufacturer of the injury-causing product, but he still sought joint and several liability against
other manufacturers. The court held that alternative liability could not apply where the
identity of the culpable party is known. 406 A.2d at 190. The court did not reject alternative
liability itself. In Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981), however, the court rejected alternative liability "on principle."
427 A.2d at 1128. The court found that in adopting the theory, "traditional concepts and
basic principles would of necessity be either distorted or abandoned altogether." Id The
court noted that application of the alternative liability theory would impose liability on one
or all of the 44 defendants, regardless of individual fault. Thus, the defendants might be
liable for injury caused by only one of the defendants, or by a company not before the court,
merely because they manufactured a product also manufactured by others. Id Similar reasoning also convinced the courts to reject alternative liability in Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538
F. Supp. 593, 598 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C.
1981); and Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 602-03, 607 P.2d 924, 930-31, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 138-39, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
57. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121, 1128 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1981). Joint and several liability was originally available in situations in
which (1) the actors knowingly join in the performance of a tortious act or acts; (2) the actors
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This theory is criticized as placing an unjust and unreasonable burden on
defendants, 58 and policy favoring recovery by an injured party is said to be
inadequate to override the rule requiring the plaintiff to identify the causative agent. 59 The use of alternative liability in unidentified-manufacturer
cases faces two other objections as well. First, the theory may lose its vitality as the number of defendants increases. Summers v. Tice involved only
two culpable parties, one of whom had caused the injury, while the
number of possibly responsible manufacturers in products liability cases
often may be in the tens or hundreds. 60 Alternative liability raises a presumption that each defendant is the cause in fact of the injury,6' but in
cases of multiple defendants the likelihood that any particular manufacturer actually produced the injury-causing item is slight. 62 For that reason
some courts have rejected alternative liability in multiple defendant cases
63
as unfair.
The second objection to imposition of alternative liability on multiple
defendants in products liability cases is the difficulty of bringing all possible tortfeasors before the court. In Summers v. Tice all persons who could
possibly have caused the injury were named as defendants. When only a
few manufacturers have produced an allegedly defective item, it may be
possible to sue all such manufacturers, 64 but such a suit may be impossible
when a large group of manufacturers is involved. Some of the manufacturers may have gone out of business or filed for bankruptcy. 65 No single
breach a common duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) a special relationship exists between the
parties; and (4) there is no concert of action, but the independent acts of several actors
concur to produce an indivisible injury. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (citing I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1
(1956)).
58. Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 30 (D. Minn 1973).
59. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 83-84 (1956). Malone
also states that the holding in Summers P. Tice resulted from the strict treatment traditionally accorded cases involving the negligent use of firearms and implies that perhaps, on
different facts, the California court would not have held the defendants liable absent more
precise proof of causation. Id. at 84.
60. See Comment, supra note 11, at 55 (large number of possible defendants in an asbestos case); Comment, supra note 18, at 964 (large number of DES manufacturers).
61. Comment, supra note 18, at 986.
62. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 630 (1981) (DES
plaintiff sued only one manufacturer; court held alternative liability not available where
plaintiff has not joined or cannot join all possible defendants); see also Robinson, supra note
21, at 724 (in DES cases odds that any given manufacturer was responsible are less than 1 in
300).
63. E.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981); Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 143, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980).
64. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In
Hall the court formulated a burden-shifting theory similar to alternative liability and allowed it to be applied to the entire blasting cap industry, which consisted of only six manufacturers and their trade association, all of whom were defendants. Id at 380; see infra notes
103-31 and accompanying text (discussion of Hall industry-wide liability).
65. Illustrative of this problem is the case of Manville Corp. (formerly Johns-Manville
Corp.), the world's leading producer of asbestos. On Aug. 26, 1982, after a study revealed
16,500 claims currently pending against Manville, with 500 additional claims filed each
month, Manville filed or ch. II bankruptcy protection against a potential two-billion-dollar

19831

COMMENTS

court may have jurisdiction over every manufacturer. Information sufficient to identify every manufacturer of a particular product may be unavailable. 66 In these situations alternative liability is inappropriate
67
because the culpable party may simply not be before the court.
Alternative liability goes far to accommodate the plaintiff who cannot
identify the specific cause of his harm. In cases involving fungible or generically marketed products it may offer the only useful recovery mechanism when the manufacturer of the damaging product escapes
identification. The theory works, however, only in cases involving products made by a small number of manufacturers, all of whom are before the
court, and all of whom are guilty of the same wrongdoing. 68 Even under
such circumstances one court has held this theory to be so 69violative of
traditional principles of tort law that it could not be applied.
II.

CONCERT OF ACTION

The concept of joint and several liability for injuries resulting from tortious conduct committed in concert is well established. 70 Generally, one
who either acts with others pursuant to a common plan to commit a tort or
otherwise assists or encourages another to carry out tortious activity is
jointly and severally liable with those whom he has encouraged or with
whom he has acted, regardless of whether his own acts actually contributed to the plaintiffs injury. 7' For joint and several liability to attach, the
liability for its asbestos products. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Other asbestos
company bankruptcy filings are predicted by the insurance industry. Id ;see also Comment,
supra note 18, at 984 n. 114 (many DES manufacturers no longer in business).
66. Comment, supra note 18, at 964 n.3.
67. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D.S.C. 1981).
68. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 390 (1950).
69. See Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121, 1128
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (adoption of alternative liability would distort or abandon traditional concepts and basic principles).
70. Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1950); Stapler v. Parler, 212
Ala. 644, 103 So. 573, 573 (1925); Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N.W. 764, 766
(1920); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666, 668 (1926). As early as 1613 it was held
that "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all of the
same party being present." Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1151
(1613), cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 46.
71. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968) (racing automobiles); Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 A.D. 91, 42 N.Y.S. 1031, 1033 (1896) (racing horses); Sprinkle v. Lemley,
243 Or. 521, 414 P.2d 797, 800-01 (1966) (physicians).
Concert of action is codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 876 of the
Restatement (Second) provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one
is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty
to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
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plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an agreement among the defendants. 72 The agreement need not be express, however; a tacit understanding is sufficient. 73 Joint and several liability for torts committed in
74
concert is most frequently imposed to deter antisocial group behavior,
75 and group assault. 76
such as drag-racing
Liability for concert of action differs from alternative liability in four
major aspects. First, under alternative liability the plaintiff must sue every
party who could have caused his loss. A plaintiff relying on a concert of
action theory, however, need not join all tortfeasors 77 because the act of
one in concert with others is the act of all, and any one tortfeasor is liable
for the wrongful conduct of the group. 78 Second, alternative liability involves independent conduct by multiple defendants, while concert of action by its very nature entails an express or tacit agreement to act
together.79 Third, under concert of action theory the burden of proof on
causal responsibility does not shift to the defendants as it does under alternative liability. 80 Because one who contributed to or encouraged the conduct that caused the loss bears equal responsibility with his co-tortfeasors,
the plaintiff need not identify one member of the group as the precise causative agent. The plaintiff need only show that all defendants were, in fact,
tortfeasors. The concerted action itself is arguably the cause of the injury,
so a plaintiff who establishes concert of action and resulting injury has met
the burden of identification. 8 ' Thus the burden of proof in a concert of
action case need not shift to the defendants. Finally, concert of action
differs from alternative liability because a defendant who can prove that
he personally did not cause the plaintiff's injury nevertheless remains liable for the entire loss if he acted in concert with others who caused it.82
Alternative liability, on the other hand, would exonerate a defendant who
72. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981).
73. See Troop v. Dew, 150 Ark. 560, 234 S.W. 992, 994 (1921); Patnode v. Westenhaver,
114 Wis. 460, 90 N.W. 467, 472 (1902); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF.

L. REV. 413, 418 (1937). Conscious parallel behavior has been held sufficient to support an
inference of tacit agreement. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
74. Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185, 190
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 comment d (1979).
75. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Andreassen v. Esposito, 90 N.J.

Super. 170, 216 A.2d 607 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966); Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or. 354, 397
P.2d 784 (1964).
76. Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950).
77. LaMarca, supra note 10, at 67.

78. Purington v. Hinchliff, 219 Ill. 159, 76 N.E. 47, 50 (1905); Boston v. Simmons, 150
Mass. 461, 23 N.E. 210, 212 (1890); Green v. Davies, 182 N.Y. 499, 75 N.E. 536, 536 (1905);
Martens v. Reilley, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N.W. 840, 844 (1901).
79. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 46.
80. LaMarca, supra note 10, at 67, 82.
81. Note, supra note 2, at 143.
82. Purington v. Hinchliff, 219 Ill. 159, 76 N.E. 47, 50 (1905); Boston v. Simmons, 150
Mass. 461, 23 N.E. 210, 212 (1890); Green v. Davies, 182 N.Y. 499, 75 N.E. 536, 536 (1905);
Martens v. Reilley, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N.W. 840, 844 (1901); Comment, Recent Developments
in Joint & Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1973).
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proves his innocence. 83
Courts have frequently applied the concert of action theory in cases of
intentional torts and negligence 84 as well as in price-fixing and other antitrust actions. 85 The concert of action theory is not widely accepted in the
products liability area, however, although the theory has been used in two
cases involving the manufacturer identification problem.86 In In re Beverly
Hills Fire Litigation8 7 the plaintiffs sued over one thousand wire and insulation manufacturers 8 for deaths caused by a fire at the Beverly Hills Supper Club in Kentucky. 89 Because the fire destroyed the allegedly defective
products, the responsible wire and insulation manufacturers could not be
identified. 90 The court allowed the plaintiffs to plead concert of action and
held that in order to recover, the plaintiffs had to prove an express or tacit
agreement among the defendants to market a standard defective product. 9 '
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,92 a DES action, involved clear concert of ac83. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175
N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). The court may not even
apportion damages among defendants of varying degrees of culpability. Miller v. Singer,
131 Colo. 112, 279 P.2d 846, 848 (1955).
84. E.g., Stapler v. Parler, 212 Ala. 644, 103 So. 573, 573 (1925) (negligence-setting
automobile on fire); Troop v. Dew, 150 Ark. 560, 234 S.W. 992, 993 (1921) (negligence-allowing fence to go unrepaired such that cattle broke through and damaged plaintiff's
crops); Daggy v. Miller, 108 Iowa 1146, 162 N.W. 854 (1917) (negligence-vehicular collision); Burton v. Roberson, 139 Tex. 562, 566, 164 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1942) (false
imprisonment).
85. See Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)
(conscious parallel behavior is evidence of concert of action in antitrust action, but not conclusive); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 223 (1939) (knowing participation in plan sufficient to establish conspiracy in antitrust action). Liability for civil
conspiacy outside antitrust also resembles concert of action liability because once the defendants' agreement is shown, any one of the defendants is liable for all of the damages.
Mims v. Bohn, 536 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
86. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., No. 77-79 (E.D. Ky. filed Nov. 14, 1979); Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
In a third case, Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979), the
Michigan Court of Appeals allowed plaintiffs to plead concert of action in a DES case. 289
N.W.2d at 27. The 182 plaintiffs alleged that all of the defendants had acted in concert to
produce and market DES without adequate safeguards, and that each plaintiff had been
injured by the product of one or another of the defendants. The court viewed the problem
as one of apportionment among proven wrongdoers. Id at 26. In order for the court to
impose joint and several liability the plaintiffs would have to prove that each defendant had
breached a duty of care in producing DES, that each plaintiff's injury resulted from ingestion of DES by her mother, and that one or more of the named defendants had manufactured the DES actually ingested. Id at 26-27. Abel does not, however, represent the
application of true concert of action because, although the plaintiffs pleaded concert, the
court spoke in terms of alternative liability. Id at 26. The court noted that each defendant
could attempt to absolve itself from liability, id, a characteristic not found in pure concert of
action theory. Moreover, the court remanded the case for trial so that the ultimate basis for
recovery, if any, is yet to be determined. Id at 27.
87. No. 77-79 (E.D. Ky. filed Nov. 4, 1979), discussed in Comment, The Market Share
Theory.- Sindell's Contribution to Industry- Wide Liability, 19 Hous. L. REv. 107, 112-13
(1981).
88. Comment, .supra note 87, at 112-13.
89. Kroll, Absolute Products Liability, supra note 24, at 187.
90. Comment, supra note 8.7, at 107.
91. Id at 113.
92. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

tion. The plaintiffs sued a single manufacturer, Lilly, and alleged that
Lilly had acted in concert with other pharmaceutical companies in the development, production, and marketing of DES. Evidence at trial disclosed
that representatives of Lilly and other manufacturers had formed a committee to expedite Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of DES
and to represent the industry before the FDA. The plaintiffs demonstrated
that Lilly and other manufacturers had applied for permission to market
DES without adequate testing, despite questions concerning the drug's efficacy and the possibility of carcinogenic effects. The evidence also indicated that the companies had pooled clinical data regarding DES and that
Lilly's literature had become the model for the DES package insert. 93 The
court stated that a jury could rationally have construed such conduct as
concerted and in pursuit of an express agreement. 94 The court thus held
Lilly liable for all of the plaintiffs' damages. 95 Such liability was fair,
noted the court, because the concert of action theory permits a plaintiff to
proceed against any one or more of the tortfeasors, 96 and because Lilly
could subsequently
pursue actions for contribution against other
97
manufacturers.
Other courts have refused to apply the concert of action theory in products liability cases, asserting that mere cooperation in the development,
production, or marketing of a product does not fit the traditional notion of
concerted activity. 98 One court has suggested, for example, that applying
for FDA approval of a new drug is not the sort of antisocial behavior that
liability for concert of action is intended to deter. 99 One commentator,
however, has praised concert of action liability as a fair means of recovery
against a products liability defendant because the defendant is free to join
other manufacturers as third-party defendants and because defendants
generally have more information than do plaintiffs regarding identification
of the culpable manufacturer.' 0 0 The concert of action theory is more practicable than alternative liability in cases involving manufacturer identification problems, because the plaintiff need not sue and establish fault as to
every possible tortfeasor.10 Particularly in cases of small industries in
which manufacturers cooperate closely, concert of action may be a viable
solution to the manufacturer identification problem. Nevertheless, most
93. 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628-30.
94. Id at 633.
95. Id at 634.

96. Id (citing Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. v. Bakers Mut. Ins., 45 N.Y.2d 551, 382 N.E.2d
1347, 410 N.Y.S.2d 57f (1978)).
97. 436 N.Y.S.2d at 634.

98. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015-16 (D.S.C. 1981); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607, 607 P.2d 924, 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980). Joint control of a risk may, however, be a sufficient basis for joint and several
liability. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 373-74 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
99. Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185, 190
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
100. LaMarca, supra note 10, at 67.
101. See supra notes 70-71, 77-78 and accompanying text.
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courts have yet to accept concert of action as an appropriate theory 0of2
recovery in products liability cases involving unknown manufacturers.'
III.

INDUSTRY-WIDE LIABILITY

The theory of industry-wide liability 0 3 derives its principles from both
concert of action and alternative liability. ° 4 As with concert of action, the
plaintiff must show that all defendants participated in joint tortious activity.' 0 5 Under industry-wide liability this tortious activity must consist of
joint and concerted adherence to a dangerous industry-wide standard in
the manufacture of the injury-producing product.1°6 Additionally, the
plaintiff must show that each defendant breached an independent duty to a
class of which the plaintiff is a member, that each defendant produced a
similar product, and that the plaintiffs injury in all probability resulted
from a defect in the product made by one of the defendants.107 Here, however, the similarity between industry-wide liability and the concert of action theory ends. Before the court will impose joint and several liability,
the plaintiff must establish, as he must under alternative liability, that he
cannot identify the manufacturer whose product caused his injury and that
this inability is not due to lack of effort by the plaintiff.' 0 8 As with alternative liability, the court will then shift the burden of identifying the precise
causative agent to the defendants, each of whom may escape liability if it
can absolve itself of culpability. 109
The concept of industry-wide liability originated in Hall v. EL Du Pont
102. Courts in four DES cases have rejected concert of action as a basis for liability. In
Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982), the court found that the DES
manufacturers "simply did not act m concert as that concept is defined in tort law." Id at
596 (footnote omitted). The court found no indication of any conduct "that might conceivably raise an inference that a tacit understanding or common plan existed among DES manufacturers." Id at 597 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004 (D.S.C. 1981), the court stated that absent a showing of an express or tacit agreement
not to test the product or provide adequate warnings, the manufacturers could not be liable
under the concert of action theory. Id at 1015-16. Lack of an agreement among the defendants also prevented application of concert of action liability in Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512
F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Mass. 1981). Finally, the court in Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), held that cooperation among drug producers was not the sort of anti-social behavior that concert of action
liability is designed to deter. 406 A.2d at 190-91.
103. Industry-wide liability is sometimes called "enterprise liability." Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608, 607 P.2d 924, 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); LaMarca, supra note 10, at 69; see also Comment, supra note 18, at 974-75 (use
of term "enterprise liability" for proposed theory based on industry-wide liability).
104. Robinson, supra note 21, at 723-24.
105. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Note, supra note 24, at 1000.
106. Comment, supra note 18, at 974.
107. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (citing
Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)); LaMarca,
supra note 10, at 70; Note, supra note 24, at 1000.
108. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
109. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Hall v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); LaMarca, supra
note 10, at 70-71.
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de Nemours & Co. ,I10 an action arising out of eighteen separate incidents
in which children were injured by blasting caps. The plaintiffs in Hall
sued all the blasting cap manufacturers in the United States"' and their
trade association, alleging that the defendants, in following insufficient industry standards, had failed to provide adequate warnings and to take adequate precautions in manufacturing the caps. The plaintiffs also
contended that because they could not identify which of the defendants
had manufactured the product actually involved in each incident,11 2 they
should be relieved of the burden of showing a causal connection between
each specific injury and the product of any single defendant. The plaintiffs
sought imposition of joint and several liability on all the manufacturers
and their trade association.
The federal district court held that the plaintiffs' pleadings raised a genuine issue concerning joint control of the risk,' 13 which is the basic element
justifying joint and several liability for concert of action.t1 4 The court
stated that joint control of a risk by members of a particular industry could
be established by proving that all members of the industry adhered to explicit or implicit safety standards, codes, or practices so that the industry in
effect operated as a collective unit.' 1 5 Because the industry members were
best able to employ foresight, precaution, and risk distribution, joint and
several liability could properly be imposed on them." 6 The court thus
held that if the plaintiffs could establish by a preponderance of the evidence: first, that the injury-causing blasting caps were made by an uniden110. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
111. The entire blasting cap industry in the United States consisted of only six manufacturers. Id at 370.
112. Id The court recognized that the plaintiffs could not be certain that the caps were
made by a U.S. company; therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs need only show that the
caps were more probably than not the product of one of the defendants. Id at 379.
113. Id at 375.
114. Id at 373-74. The court listed three ways in which the plaintiffs could show joint
control of the risk:
First, plaintiffs can prove the existence of an explicit agreement and joint action among the defendants with regard to warnings and other safety features--the classic "concert of action.' Second, plaintiffs can submit evidence
of defendants' parallel behavior sufficient to support an inference of tacit
agreement or cooperation ....
Third, plaintiffs can submit evidence that defendants, acting independently,
adhered to an industry-wide standard or custom with regard to the safety features of blasting caps. Regardless of whether such evidence is sufficient to
support an inference of tacit agreement, it is still relevant to the question of
joint control of risk.
Id (citations omitted). "Joint control of risk" thus signifies situations in which several defendants have either collectively created a risk or exercised collective control over the riskcreating product or activity. Id at 375-76.
115. Id at 374-75 (citing Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.
1960) (joint liability of makers of components of explosive charge based on defendants'
control over product safety at critical stage when high degree of care required); Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (joint liability of
automobile manufacturer and retailer based in part on their joint ability to eliminate risk)).
116. 345 F. Supp. at 376-78 (citing Win. Tackaberry Co. v. Sioux City Serv. Co., 154
Iowa 358, 378, 132 N.W. 945, 952-53 (1911) (Weaver, J., dissenting); Moses v. Morgantown,
192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926)).
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tifiable defendant; second, that each defendant breached a duty of care
owed to the plaintiffs; and third, that the breaches were substantially concurrent and of a similar nature, then the burden of proof on causal responsibility would shift to the defendants. "! 7 The court thus approved the
imposition of liability on the entire industry. The Hall decision clearly
resulted from the court's recognition of the plaintiffs' inability to obtain
relief under any existing legal theory in New York although they had sustained compensable injuries.1 18 Consequently, the court developed a recovery theory to afford the plaintiffs relief.
The Hall theory has yet to be adopted by any other court. 1 9 Courts
have been reluctant to accept industry-wide liability partly because they
consider it a drastic deviation from traditional tort law principles of causation,' 2 0 since the theory renders every manufacturer an insurer not only of
its own products, but of similar products of other manufacturers. 12
Courts and commentators further criticize industry-wide liability on several grounds. First, because the theory requires that all members of the
industry be defendants, a precise industry must be defined, and all mem117. 345 F. Supp. at 380.
118. The first New York decision adopting alternative liability, Thrower v. Smith, 62
A.D.2d 907, 406 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1978), occurred after Hall. The court in Thrower, citing no
New York authority for alternative liability other than Hall, stated: "[I]t
is generally accepted that where several defendants, who are found to be tort-feasors, are guilty of acts,
only one of which caused the injury, all are liable absent a showing as to whose act was the
cause . .

. ."

406 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citations omitted).

119. Two courts have rejected industry-wide liability as too great a deviation from traditional tort law principles. The court in Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp.
183 (S.D. Ga. 1982), held that the Hall theory violated Georgia's products liability rule that
a manufacturer is not an insurer of his products. Id at 190. The court also stated that
imposition of industry-wide liability would have undesirable social and economic effects, in
that it would endanger the manufacturer's continued ability to spread losses and, further,
would cause unfair assessment of damages against manufacturers whose products were not
clearly the cause of the loss. Id. In Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19,
427 A.2d 1121 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981), the court stated that adoption of industry-wide
liability "would, of necessity, result in total abandonment of the well settled principle that
manufacturers are only responsible for damages caused by a defective product upon proof
that the product was defective and that the defect arose while the product was in the control
of defendant." 427 A.2d at 1129.
The court in Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981), stated that DES
manufacturers should not be punished for following government-prescribed standards. Id
at 1018. Similarly, in Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982), the court
stated that if liability were predicated on deficient industry-wide standards, responsibility
would lie with the FDA as the standard-setter for the drug industry. Id at 598. The Morton
court also distinguished the large, decentralized drug industry from the smaller blasting cap
industry in concluding that the Hall theory should not be applied to DES cases. Id
The court in Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rejected industry-wide liability on the facts before it, since the
plaintiff had been able to identify the culpable manufacturer, noting that industry-wide liability only applies where the responsible party's identity is unknown. 406 A.2d at 190. The
court did not, however, reject the theory itself.
120. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Namm
v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981); see supra note 119.
121. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Namm
v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981).
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bers of that industry identified.122 Plaintiffs may have difficulty identifying the qualities that make products so similar that the manufacturers may
be said to be in the same industry.' 23 This problem would be particularly
acute if the industry were composed of thousands of members.124 Second,
critics contend that concerted action requires more than use of an industrywide standard to justify imposition of joint and several liability. 25 This
criticism contains particular force when, as in the DES cases, the standard
has been set or authorized by a governmental agency charged with oversight of the industry.' 26 Third, the virtual elimination of the plaintiffs
burden of identifying the responsible manufacturer assumes that manufacturers have better access to relevant information than do plaintiffs. If that
assumption is false, then liability may be unfairly imposed on manufacturers who possess no means of exculpating themselves.m27 Fourth, one writer
charges that industry-wide liability would adversely affect the market
place by vastly increasing the risk of liability for product-related injuries,
which in turn would discourage research and development of new products. 128 Similarly, trade associations like the one in Hall might curtail

standards development and testing activities, which contribute to industry
safety, in order to avoid any appearance of concerted action by the manufacturers.' 29 Conversely, the larger manufacturers might eliminate marginal producers through efforts to impose suitable industry-wide
standards.' 30 One court has stated, finally, that in industries composed of
many members the probability that any particular manufacturer produced
the injury-causing item is so small that the imposition of liability would
simply be unjust.' 3' Limitation of the theory to the situations contem122. Shea, Product Liability: .4 Continuing Process of Change, 68 A.B.A. J. 576, 577
(1982).
123. Id In Davis v. Yearwood, 612 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), plaintiffs sued for
injuries and deaths resulting from a jail fire. The defendants were the manufacturers of
various chemical and plastic products in the jail, but plaintiffs were unable to establish
which manufacturer's product caused their damages. The court rejected the plaintiffs' plea
for application of industry-wide liability, distinguishing Hall because of the size difference
between the blasting cap industry in Hall and the chemical and plastics industries. Id at
920. The court also distinguished the DES cases, in which a specific product caused the
injury, and noted that in the present case any one of a variety of items could have caused the
loss. Id at 920. The court concluded that the adoption of industry-wide liability was inapSropriate because of the lack of similarity among the products and manufacturers involved.
Id
124. The Hall court itself recognized that its theory, while appropriate in an industry
containing a small number of manufacturers, would be manifestly unreasonable if applied
to a large, decentralized industry. 345 F. Supp. at 378.
125. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608, 607 P.2d 924, 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
142, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Comment, supra note 18, at 997.
126. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 2d 588, 608, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
142, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
127. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 1.83, 190 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Note,
supra note 24, at 1000-01.
128. Note, supra note 24, at 1004.
129. See Shea, supra note 122, at 577.
130. Note, supra note 24, at 1005.
131. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
142-43, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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plated by the Hall court would partially alleviate these concerns raised by
potential general application of industry-wide liability.
IV. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
One commentator has proposed a refined version of industry-wide liability that contains the following elements:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative
agent and such inability is due to the nature of the defendant's
conduct.
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by
all the defendants.
3) Plaintiffs injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was
a member.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury
was caused by the product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of such
defective products on the market at the time of plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industrywide standard of safety as
to the manufacture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of
whichever32cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict
liability.'
The commentator suggests an additional element that distinguishes the
proposed theory from industry-wide liability: although each defendant
may exonerate itself by proving that its product could not have caused the
plaintiff's injury, a defendant who cannot exculpate itself is subject not to
joint and several liability but rather to liability in proportion to its share of
the product market.' 33 This theory supposedly combines the best elements
of the concert of action 34 and alternative liability theories 35 with a
method of apportioning damages that is fair in view of the proportionate
36
probability that each defendant actually caused the plaintiffs injury.'
132. Comment, supra note 18, at 995. Element 5 varies from the Hall court's preponderance of the evidence standard. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The author suggests that the "clear and convincing evidence" test
is consistent with the standard generally applied to joining parties in civil cases. Comment,
supra note 18, at 995 (citing C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 340, at 796 (E. Cleary 2d ed.

1972)).
133. Comment, supra note 18, at 995.
134. Id

at 996. Under the proposed test, the element of concerted action within an in-

dustry would be satisfied by parallel behavior, such as adherence to an inadequate safety
standard or concurrent manufacture of an identically defective product. Id. This standard
is less rigorous than the requirement of conscious agreement, a standard often applied by
courts imposing the Hall liability theory. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345

F. Supp. 353, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
135. Comment, supra note 18, at 996. Under the traditional Summers alternative liabil-

ity theory the plaintiff is required to join all possible tortfeasors; under the proposed model a
plaintiff need only show a high probability that one of the defendants caused the injury. Id;
see Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
136. Comment, supra note 18, at 997, 999.
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In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,137 a DES case, the California Supreme
Court adopted the damage apportionment element of market share liability.' 38 The court declined, however, to adopt those elements of market
share liability that are similar to industry-wide liability. 39 The Sindell
court relied on the difference between the small number of defendants in
Hall v. EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co. ,140 in which industry-wide liability
was applied, and the large number of DES manufacturers to demonstrate
that industry-wide liability was inapplicable to a DES case.' 4' The court
noted that in Hall the manufacturers' delegation to a trade association of
certain safety functions had served as a basis for finding joint control of
the risk, while the DES manufacturers had not delegated such functions.14 2 Instead, the court found that the FDA was responsible for safety
control in the pharmaceutical industry and concluded that drug manufacturers could not justly be held liable for following government
43
standards. 1
The Sindell court sympathized, however, with the plaintiffs inability to
identify the responsible manufacturer of a generically produced product. l'1 Following Summers v. Tice,145 the court stated that as between an
innocent plaintiff and defendants who produced injury-causing products,
the defendants should bear the cost of the injury, particularly where the
defendants had the best opportunity to discover and guard against defects
in their products.146 The court observed that the defendants had contributed to the plaintiffs inability to identify the responsible tortfeasor by producing a product with harmful effects that did not manifest themselves
until years after consumption.' 47 Moreover, the court found that the defendants could best shoulder the cost of the injury.' 4 8 The supreme court
concluded that a modification of the Summers rule was therefore war137. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
138. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
139. Id at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
140. 345 F. Supp. 353, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see supra note Ill and accompanying text.
141. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. But see Comment, supra

note 18, at 995 (author developed her theory specifically for application to DES litigation).
142. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
143. Id The court referred to regulations specifying the tests a manufacturer must perform on certain drugs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 436.206-.333 (1982); the type of packaging required, id

§ 429.10; the warnings that must appear on labels, id § 369.20; and the standards to be
followed in the manufacture of a drug, id §§ 211.22-.208. 26 Cal. 3d at 609 n.26, 607 P.2d at

935 n.26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143 n.26.
144. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
145. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
146. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (in era of

mass production and complex marketing methods, traditional negligence standard insufficient to govern obligations of manufacturer to consumer)). The Sindell court stated that the
rise in production of fungible goods necessitated some adaptation of the rules of causation
and liability, just as the complexity of the market had demanded in the time of Escola. 26
Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.

147. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144; cf Ybarra v. Spangard, 25

Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (res ipsa loquitur case where defendants possessed all infor-

mation regarding causation).
148. 26 Cal. 3d at 510, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144; see Calabresi, Some
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ranted and adopted the market share concept for apportionment of damages.' 49 According to the court, if the plaintiff joined as defendants the
producers of a "substantial share" of the DES market, the burden of identifying the manufacturer of the actual injury-causing drug would shift to
the defendants.' 50 Each defendant who could not exculpate itself would
be liable for a share of the plaintiff's damages in proportion to such defendant's share of the appropriate market.' 5' Each manufacturer's liability would therefore approximate its probable share of responsibility for the
injuries caused by the drug. The Sindell holding thus applied alternative
52
liability with the addition of an element of proportionate contribution.
As a practical matter, market share liability is problematic in application. The number of manufacturers who must be named as defendants
remains uncertain. The Sindell court required producers representing a
"substantial share" of the market to be joined as defendants, but failed to
define "substantial share."' 5 3 Sindell thus leaves courts without a standard
for determining the adequacy of market representation in any particular
case. The5 Sindell
court also gave little guidance as to the meaning of
"market."' 4 That term could mean a market as small as the city in which
the DES plaintiff's mother resided, determined during the year in which
the mother took the drug, or it could include worldwide production during
the entire period of the drug's manufacture. In addition, as with industrywide liability, the membership of a particular industry may be difficult to
define. Finally, the Sindell court did not define what sorts of goods, other
than pharmaceuticals, constitute the fungible type of product for which
market share is appropriate. 55 These difficulties of56application may diminish the effectiveness of the market share theory.
Market share liability has also been strongly criticized for its potential
effects on industry. The theory has been described as radical,' 57 tantamount to absolute liability, 58 and a major departure from established tort
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. i (1960).

149. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P,2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
150. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
151. Id
152. Robinson,supra note 21, at 768.
153. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145; Comment, Market Share
Liability--Proposalsfor Application, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 523, 525 (1982). The Comment from
which the Sindell court drew much of its
rationale for market share suggested that 75-80% of
the market would be appropriate. Comment, supra note 18, at 996.
154. Comment, supra note 87, at 129.
155. Comment, supra note 153, at 529.
156. Other practical problems with market share include possible unavailability of market share data and difficulty in properly assessing damages if one or more defendants were
not in the subject market for the market's duration. See Comment, supra note 87, at 129;
Comment, supra note 153, at 533.
157. Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Comment, The
DES Cases and Liability Wt.,hout Causation, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 517 (1982).

158. Gillick, The Essence of Enterprise Liability, or the True Meaning of "We're All inthis
Together," 16 FORUM 979, 987 (1981).
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law. 159 The chief objection voiced is that some manufacturers may repeatedly be required to pay for injuries caused by manufacturers not named as
parties. 60 Sindell's deep-pocket rationale arguably makes insurers out of
manufacturers. 61 Commentators claim that market share liability would
discourage development of innovative or complex products because of uncertainty as to future effects of the product. 162 One writer contends that
market share liability would also increase the cost of nondefective products, either because of the prohibitive expense of insuring against extensive
liability or because the self-insured manufacturer would transfer the cost
of his market share liability to other products.' 63 The prevailing reason for
rejecting the theory, however, is its abandonment of the traditional ele64
ment of causal identification.'
Only one court other than the California Supreme Court has apportioned damages according to the market share liability theory. In Ferrigno
v. Eli Lilly & Co. 165 the New Jersey superior court applied the alternative
liability theory in a DES case, but invoked the market share approach to
determine the liability of each defendant that could not exculpate itself.
The Ferrigno court found the Sindell rule a more reasonable solution to
the inability to ascertain actual culpability than joint and several liability.' 66 In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 67 an asbestos case, a federal district court in Texas allowed a cross-action and discovery based on
159.

Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981); Gillick, supra note

158, at 987.
160. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 1623, 1659 (1981); Comment, Policyand Proof: Shifting the Burden of Proofin a Prod-

ucts Liability Case, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 83, 102 (1982).
161. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Ryan

v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1017 (D.S.C. 1981).

162. Comment, supra note 153, at 536. But see Comment, supra note 157, at 521-22
(doubtful that market share will discourage product development or product safety).
163. Kroll, Absolute Products Liability, supra note 24, at 196.
164. Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Starling v. Sea-

board Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 186 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526
F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1017 (D.S.C.
1981).
165. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1980); see upra notes 4656 and accompanying text.
166. 420 A.2d at 1316.
167. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982). The market share portion of the district court's opinion was not appealed. 681 F.2d
at 336. The district court in Hardy, an asbestos case, granted a partial summary judgment
for plaintiffs based on nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel and judicial notice. 509 F.
Supp. at 1362-63. This ruling was based on the holding in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), that asbestos insulation manufacturers were strictly liable to an insulation worker who contracted asbestosis and
mesothelioma. 493 F.2d at 1087-92. In Hardy the district court construed Borel as establishing as a matter of law that asbestos insulation products were unavoidably unsafe products and that asbestos is a competent producing cause of mesothelioma and asbestosis.
Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1360. The Fifth Circuit reversed Hardy on this issue, holding that
defendants who were not parties to Borel were not estopped, because collateral estoppel
requires identity of parties. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 340-41. The court also held that defendants
who were parties to Borel were not estopped because the Borel opinion was ambiguous on
the issues on which the district court in Hardy relied. Id at 345.
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the market share theory. 168 The court stated that market share liability is
more fair than pro rata contribution because it imposes liability in relation
to fault and not merely in proportion to the number of defendants. 169 The
Hardy court subsequently vacated its order, however, on the ground that
the market share theory could not be reconciled with traditional theories of
tort recovery in Texas.' 70 Neither Ferrigno nor the vacated Hardy opinion
confronts the practical questions inherent in applying market share theory
to specific facts. Both cases merely approve the general concept of market
share liability. The issue of whether trial courts can handle the complex
computations and elusive evidence involved in determining precise market
shares for assessment of damages therefore remains unanswered.
V.

THE RECOVERY THEORIES AND TExAs LAW

The Texas courts have not had occasion to discuss enterprise liability. 171
The growing number of cases involving manufacturer identification
problems,17 2 however, increases the likelihood of a Texas court decision on
enterprise liability in the near future. This Comment therefore analyzes
the Texas tort law precedents upon which Texas courts may rely in considering the enterprise liability theories. This analysis leads to the conclusion
that under present law the courts of Texas will accept none of these theories. This prediction rests on an evaluation of Texas law regarding proof
of causation, manufacturer liability in general, and the concept of risk
allocation.
A.

Policy Prerequisitesto Enterprise Liability

Adoption of any of the enterprise liability theories by Texas courts will
necessitate changes in several policies underlying past decisions. First, the
plaintiff's traditional duty to identify a specific defendant responsible for
the injury-causing product will require modification. In Texas proof1 of
73
causation is an essential element in a strict products liability action.
168. 509 F. Supp. at 1360. The court's order was given in response to a motion by one of
the defendants; the plaintiffs had not asserted market share liability. Id at 1354.
169. Id at 1358-59.
170. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. M-79-145-CA (E.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 1982)
(order vacating order granting discovery and cross-action based on market share theory).
171. Texas is not unusual in this regard. The reported decisions reflect that the courts of
only three states have addressed enterprise liability. Their discussions appear in Namm v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19,427 A.2d 1121, 1128 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
(alternative liability rejected as abandoning traditional tort law); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (alternative liability
accepted; market share modified and accepted); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc.,
170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185, 190 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (alternative liability and
industry-wide liability rejected because plaintiff identified tortfeasor; concert of action rejected because cooperation in drug development not anti-social); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 630 (1981) (concert of action accepted); and Davis v.
Yearwood, 612 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (industry-wide liability rejected as
inappropriate to facts).
172. See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text.
173. Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. 1972); Fort Worth Steel
& Mach. Co. v. Norsworthy, 570 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ dism'd)
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The plaintiff must show that the product was defective at the time it left
the defendant's hands 174 and that his injury was the result of some act by
that defendant.175 Texas courts have found the causation requirement satisfied and have imposed joint and several liability on defendants who have
acted concurrently to produce an indivisible injury. 1 76 Joint and several
liability may be imposed, however, only where all defendants have caused
some injury to the plaintiff.177 No Texas court has adopted the holding in
Summers v. Tice, 78 which allowed joint and several liability where less
than all of the defendants had injured the plaintiff. Texas law thus lacks
the requisite foundation for abandonment of the manufacturer identification element in products liability cases.
The second prerequisite to acceptance of enterprise liability is a willingness by the courts to increase the financial burdens on industry. The enterprise liability theories necessarily increase costs to manufacturers who are
found liable for injuries despite a possible lack of responsibility for the
injury-causing product. 179 The manufacturer also must bear the expense
of defending lawsuits in the absence of evidence of a causal connection
between its product and the plaintiffs injury. Although the adoption of
strict liability by the Texas Supreme Court enlarged the scope of manufacturers' liability, strict products liability applies only to the seller or producer of the product which injured the plaintiff, not to the sellers or
80
producers of similar products.
The Texas Supreme Court has also held that a manufacturer is not an
(relying on Technical Chem. Co.); Welch v. Coca-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n, 380 S.W.2d 26, 28
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, no writ).
174. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. 1979) (citing Jack
Roach-Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262, 278 (Tex. 1967)); Pittsburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1969); Dr Pepper Co. v. Crow, 621
S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (citing Pittsburg Coca-Cola).
175. Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Fillmore, 453 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, no writ).
176. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. at 1359 (citing Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952)).
177. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-96 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Phillips v. Gulf & South Am. Steamship Co., 323 S.W.2d 631, 635
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ reftd).
178. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1948).
179. The increased cost results from payment of damages to plaintiffs who were probably
injured by another manufacturer's product, whereas in traditional tort law a manufacturer
pays only for damages proven to result from his own product. See Fischer, supra note 160,
at 1644 (discussing possibility, under market share theory, that manufacturer will have to
pay more than his market share percentage of losses caused by similar products of all
manufacturers).
180. In McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967), the Texas
Supreme Court adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 402A
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
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insurer of his product;' 8" when a plaintiff misuses a product or assumes the
83
risk of a known danger, the manufacturer is relieved of all' 8 2 or part of
the responsibility for the loss. Texas courts thus expect manufacturers to
assume financial responsibility for injuries resulting from defects in their
own products, but do not hold a manufacturer liable for an injury not
caused by its product. Enterprise liability theories, however, would make
a manufacturer potentially liable for injuries caused by a product not
proven to have been manufactured by it.
The third element necessary for the adoption of enterprise liability in
Texas is a policy judgment that it is better to force a defendant to pay for a
loss not clearly attributable to his conduct than to leave an injured party
uncompensated.' 84 The court in Summers v. Tice approved such a policy
when it shifted the risk of loss to the defendants. 8 5 Texas courts have
made analogous, though more limited, value judgments. In Landers v.
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. 186 the Texas Supreme Court abrogated the rule that defendants who had acted independently of one another could not be sued jointly in a tort action, even though their acts had
produced a single indivisible injury. 8 7 The court held instead that independent tortfeasors could be held jointly and severally liable for an indivisible injury.' 8 8 The supreme court considered the former rule unjust
because it effectively relieved defendants of the consequences of their
wrongs and required an innocent plaintiff to suffer his injury without recompense.' 89 Thus, the policy of fairness to the injured party prevailed
over established law.190 Risk allocation under the enterprise liability the(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

181. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. 1978); Shamrock
Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1967).
182. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1967); Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ
dism'd).
183. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
184. See, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (compelling policy supports recovery by innocent plaintiff
against manufacturer defendant known to be wrongdoer). The inherent policy judgment in
enterprise liability is thus that the risk of loss that may result from a defective product is to
be borne by defendants known to have produced such a defective product.
185. 199 P.2d at 4.
186. 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
187. Id at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734 (overruling Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, judgmt adopted) (action in tort for damages may not be maintained against several defendants jointly when defendants acted independently in injuring
plaintiff)).
188. 151 Tex. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
189. Id
190. The court made a similar policy decision when it adopted the rule of strict liability
for manufacturers of defective food products in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). The court stated that public policy favoring consumers and the
protection of human health required the imposition of strict liability; the court found partic-
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ory requires a policy judgment even more favorable to plaintiffs than does
the imposition of joint and several liability in negligence, however, because some manufacturer-defendants in the enterprise liability situation
may not have caused any injury at all to the particular plaintiff.' 9'
B.

Precedentsfor EnterpriseLiability

In addition to comparing the policies underlying Texas tort law and enterprise liability, a determination must be made as to whether Texas case
law provides a precedential basis for imposition of enterprise liability in
products liability cases. This determination requires analysis of the precedents relied on by courts of other jurisdictions in adopting the enterprise
liability theories. If Texas law contains similar precedents, then theoretically the Texas courts could make a similar policy decision to adopt enterprise liability.
1. Alternative Liability. The adoption of alternative liability in Summers v. Tice 192 resulted primarily from a policy decision by the California
Supreme Court. 193 The court did, however, base its decision in part on
Ybarra v. Spangard, 94 a res ipsa loquitur negligence case in which the
plaintiff, through no fault of his own, could not prove which of the defendants had caused his injury.' 95 The Ybarra court held that the defendants
should carry the burden of exculpating themselves because evidence of
causation was available to them but not to the plaintiff.' 96 The Summers
court similarly shifted the burden to the defendants. 97 The Summers
court also cited a number of concert of action cases from other jurisdictions, relying not on the substantive nature of concert of action liability,
but on the underlying policy favoring risk-shifting that those cases supported. 98 Because California law, like Texas law, lacks actual precedent
for alternative liability, Texas courts arguably could adopt the theory for
the same policy reasons given in Summers. Texas courts have been relucularly compelling the consumer's ordinary inability to analyze food for defects prior to con-

sumption. Id at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
191. See generally Comment, supra note 160, at 97-103 (policy favoring recovery by injured party competes with traditional policy requiring identification of causal agent; latter
policy abrogated by enterprise liability).
192. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
193. Prosser, supra note 68, at 389-90.
194. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), cited in Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
195. 154 P.2d at 689. The plaintiff in Ybarra was injured while unconscious on an operating table; the defendants were the physicians and nurses attending him. Id
196. Id at 690.
197. 199 P.2d at 4.
198. Id at 3. The court quoted Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1927), in
which two persons hunting together fired their guns across a highway, injuring a traveller on
the road. The Oliver court stated: "We think that ... each is liable for the resulting injury
to the [plaintiff], although no one can say definitely who actually shot him. To hold otherwise would be to exonerate both from liability, although each was negligent, and the injury
resulted from such negligence." 110 So. at 668. The Oliver court based the imposition of
joint and several liability on a finding that the defendants had acted in pursuit of a common
purpose. Id
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such policy changes without judicial precedent or
tant, however, to make
199
authority.
legislative
The absence of precedential support for alternative liability in Texas
contrasts with the situation in Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,200 in which the
New Jersey court adopted alternative liability in products liability cases.
Not only did the forum state in Ferrigno possess the indivisible injury
rule, 20 1 but the New Jersey Supreme Court had already applied true alternative liability in a negligence case. 20 2 The Ferrigno court could thus
build on an existing policy favoring recovery by innocent plaintiffs who
could not identify the specific causes of their injuries. 20 3 Because Texas
courts have not developed this policy, a Texas court would be unlikely to
impose alternative liability in a products liability case. Assuming that the
policy of fairness as between an innocent plaintiff and strictly liable defendants would be persuasive to a Texas court, the countervailing policy
that manufacturers are not insurers of their products would probably still
prevent the court from applying alternative liability.
2. Concert ofAction. Texas courts have applied concert of action liability in cases not involving products liability for many years. 2°4 Texas
tort law thus contains the same precedential basis for applying the concert
of action theory in products liability cases as does the law of those states
that have already takeRi this step. In applying concert of action to the multiple manufacturer products liability situation, the courts in both Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co. 205 and Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. 206 treated their decisions as
natural extensions of existing concert of action liability. 20 7 Neither court
was troubled by what the Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories court considered
208
an expansion of concert of action liability far beyond its intended scope.
In Sindell the California court described the typical concert of action case
as involving a small number of defendants whose actions over a short period of time resulted in a tort against a single plaintiff, with each defendant
being held liable as a direct or indirect participant in the tort.2°9 Texas
199. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862-63 (Tex. 1977).
200. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
201. Hill v. Macomber, 103 N.J. Super. 127, 246 A.2d 731 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
202. Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
203. 420 A.2d at 1314 (citing Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super.
183, 406 A.2d 185 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)).
204. Burton v. Roberson, 139 Tex. 562, 566, 164 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1942) (citing Wolf v.
Perryman, 82 Tex. 112, 118-20, 17 S.W. 772, 775-76 (1891)); Markham v. Houston Direct
Navigation Co., 73 Tex. 247, 250, 11 S.W. 131, 132 (1889).
205. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
206. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
207. The Bichler court stated: "It does not strain one's sense of fairness to allow a limited expansion of the doctrine of concerted action to cover the type of circumstances faced in
a DES case .. " 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The Abel court was more straightforward: "In so
holding, we adopt no new theory of law. . . . We simply follow precedent .... . 289
N.W.2d at 27.
208. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 606, 601P.2d 924, 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert. denied, 449 U.S.

912 (1980).
209. 26 Cal. 3d at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
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concert of action cases generally fit this description. 210 Additionally, the
prevailing view in other jurisdictions holds that the conduct of manufacturers in developing and marketing a defective product does not constitute
the sort of antisocial group behavior that concert of action liability is intended to prevent. 2 1 1 Texas courts thus are unlikely to apply concert of
action liability in products liability cases. This prediction must, however,
be qualified. In a products liability case involving only two or three manufacturers, all of whom had directly cooperated in culpable conduct, the
application of concert of action liability by a Texas court would not be so
great a departure from policy or precedent as it would be in cases involv2 12
ing members of large industries.
3. Industry-Wide Liability. In Hall v. EI Du Pont de Nemours &
Co. 213 the federal district court relied on cases from many states in formulating its industry-wide liability theory.2 14 The court held that liability for
joint control of a risk could arise out of a business relationship or joint
enterprise, 215 but that the joint enterprise need not entail a profit-sharing
element for joint and several liability to apply.21 6 The court thus concluded that independent members of an industry who had followed the
210. See, e.g., Krishnan v. Garza, 570 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ) (action against doctor and hospital for malpractice); Carlile v. Easterling, 502
S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1973, no writ) (tort action against two parties for
interference in performance of contract); Leon's Shoe Stores, Inc. v. Hornsby, 306 S.W.2d
402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, no writ) (action against store and store employee for false
imprisonment).
211. Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 596-97 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Ryan v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015-16 (D.S.C. 1981); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp.
1031, 1038 (D. Mass. 1981); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183,
406 A.2d 185, 190 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
212. One Texas decision discusses concert of action in a products liability context. In
McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the court stated: "It is the general rule in Texas that two or more persons become
joint tort feasors when they participate in concerted action to commit a common tort and
accomplish their purpose." Id at 139. The court held the two defendants in McMillen
jointly and severally liable for supplying defective animal feed. Id The defendants, however, were the actual supplier'of the product and another corporation of which the supplier
was the wholly owned subsidiary. McMillen is thus not a case of two or more distinct parties
acting in concert, but of two parties constituting essentially a single entity. No other products liability case in Texas could be found that discusses concert of action.
213. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
214. Id at 372-73 (citing Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir.
1960); Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950); Troop v. Dew, 150 Ark. 560, 234
S.W. 992 (1921); Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Prussak v. Hutton, 30
A.D. 66, 51 N.Y.S. 761 (1898); Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 A.D. 91, 42 N.Y.S. 1031 (1896);
Moses v. Morgantown, 192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926); Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or. 521,
414 P.2d 797 (1966); Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Oregon-Washington R.R. &
Navigation Co., 32 Wash. 2d 256, 201 P.2d 207 (1948)).
215. 345 F. Supp. at 372 (citing Troop v. Dew, 150 Ark. 560, 234 S.W. 992 (1921); Lindsay v. Acme Plaster Co., 220 Mich. 367, 190 N.W. 275 (1922); Prussak v. Hutton, 30 A.D. 66,
51 N.Y.S. 761 (1898); Walton, Witten & Graham v. Miller's Adm'x, 109 Va. 210,63 S.E. 458
(1909)).
216. 345 F. Supp. at 373 (citing Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d
850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (bank liable for negligence in exercising its share
of control over housing development contractor whom bank financed)).
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same inadequate standards could be held jointly and severally liable because of their joint control of the risk.2 17 Texas courts would be less likely
than the Hall court to adopt precedents from other jurisdictions. Under
Texas law participants in a joint adventure must have a common interest
in the objects and pursuits of the enterprise, an agreement to share profits
and losses, and an express or implied right to control one another's conduct. 2 18 In contrast, the defendant-manufacturers in Hall shared no such
common interests or mutual right of control but rather pursued independent profit-seeking activity. 2 19 The Hall court also relied on the Summers v.
Tice holding. As discussed above, Texas does not follow the Summers
rule, even in negligence cases. Texas thus lacks the precedential basis for
Hall's theory of industry-wide liability. 220 The Hall court's restriction of
its theory to cases involving small, close-knit industries further decreases
a fact situation in which they
the chance that Texas courts will confront
22 1
would apply industry-wide liability.
4. Market Share. The only distinction between the alternative liability and market share theories is the degree of liability imposed on the defendants. Under alternative liability the defendants are jointly and
severally liable for all of the plaintifTs damages, while the market share
approach imposes liability according to each defendant's percentage of the
market. 222 As discussed above, Texas courts are unlikely to adopt alternative liability, which the Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories223 court relied on as
precedent for adoption of market share liability; thus the adoption of market share liability is also unlikely in Texas. The availability in Texas of
contribution among joint tortfeasors provides no basis for market share
liability, because contribution in Texas operates on a pro rata system
224
rather than a percentage of causation or percentage of market formula.
The vacated opinion in Hardy v. Johns-Manville225 indicated that the
movement toward comparative fault in Texas products liability law sup217. 345 F. Supp. at 374.
218. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 631, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1956); Raybourn v. Lewis,
567 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tonahill v. Pickett, 278 S.W.2d 930, 931-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. 345 F. Supp. at 373.
220. Texas courts could conceivably draw on precedent from other jurisdictions, as the
Hall court did, to support industry-wide liability or any other form of enterprise liability.
The scope of this Comment, however, is necessarily confined to precedents existing within
Texas law; whether Texas courts will go outside their own precedents to justify enterprise
liability is highly speculative.
221. The fact that most of the decisions discussing industry-wide liability and the other
enterprise liability theories are by federal courts may be a factor in the future of these theories in Texas, because Texas state courts may not have the opportunity to decide a case with
facts that would be appropriate for adopting enterprise liability under state court precedents.
222. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
223. 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
224. Under the pro rata system, contribution is determined according to the number of
defendants and not according 'to the percentage of fault or causation attributable to each
defendant. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN'i.art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).
225. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex. 1981); cf.
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ports imposition of market share liability, but to date a complete system of
comparative fault has not developed. 226 Further, a comparative fault system ordinarily apportions damages according to actual causative fault.
Because the manufacturer identification problem continues to exist in a
comparative fault system, the actual causative fault of each defendant remains impossible to determine. 227 Hardy also cited the availability ofjoint
and several liability in Texas as an indication that Texas courts would follow Sindell.228 As demonstrated above, however, Texas courts allow joint
and several liability only as to proven tortfeasors, while the market share
theory imposes liability on parties not shown to have caused the plaintiffs
harm.
Thus the Texas methods of apportioning liability will not accommodate
the market share theory. The conclusion must be that Texas courts, which
traditionally have been cautious in developing products liability law, will
not accept market share liability because that theory is inconsistent with
state law.229
VI.

CONCLUSION

The enterprise liability theories are presently the subject of much commentary. Because of practical difficulties and policy considerations, however, very few courts have applied any of the theories in products liability
cases. Enterprise liability theories arose from a concern that plaintiffs who
are injured by defective products deserve compensation for their losses,
even though they may be unable to attach the blame to a particular defendant. Each of the theories discussed in this Comment represents an
earnest attempt to solve the plaintiffs dilemma. At the same time, each
theory compromises to some extent the traditional rule that a defendant
Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (stating that adoption of

comparative negligence does not indicate trend to abandon causation element).
226. An element of comparative causation was introduced into Texas's strict liability law
in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), to the extent that the
plaintiffs misuse of a product reduces his recovery in proportion to the percentage of causation attributable to the misuse. Id at 352. Comparative negligence is also held to apply to
an action for breach of warranty. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d
320, 329 (Tex. 1978). Texas has not, however, adopted a complete system of comparative
fault for strict products liability like the comparative fault system created by the California
Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978).
227. Furthermore, comparative fault in products liability would favor the defendants in
disallowing recovery of the portion of the damages that the defendant did not cause; thus it
serves a purpose opposite to that of enterprise liability, which encourages recovery.
228. 509 F. Supp. at 1359.
229. Federal courts have rejected enterprise liability on the ground that it is antithetical
to the law of the forum state. See Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599 (M.D. Fla.
1982) (market share theory contrary to Florida tort law); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (market share and industry-wide liability have
no basis in Georgia tort law); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981)
(market share contrary to public policy and unequivocal tort law of South Carolina); Ryan
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981) (market share contrary to state
law); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (D. Mass. 1981) (adoption of enterprise liability is step that must be taken by state supreme court).
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should not be held liable unless the plaintiff identifies him as the cause of
the plaintiffs injury. Because Texas courts hold iast to this traditional
rule, adoption of any one of the enterprise liability theories would be contrary to policy and precedent. Thus under existing law in Texas the adoption of enterprise liability theories appears highly unlikely.
The unfairness of enterprise liability to manufacturers renders it appropriate that Texas courts should reject the theories. An alternate solution is
clearly necessary, however, for equitable disposition of the cases, virtually
certain to arise in Texas, involving unidentifiable manufacturers. Only
when the legal community has taken note of the potentially overwhelming
impact of these cases on the Texas court system will a creative and practical solution result. A need thus exists for immediate and serious attention
to the manufacturer identification problem from both the legislature and
the bar.

